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Abstract
Petascale computing requires I/O subsystems that can keep up with the dramatic computing power de­
manded by such systems. TOP500.org ranks top computers based on their peak compute performance, but 
there has not been adequate investigation o f the current state-of-the-art and future requirements o f  storage 
area networks that support petascale computers. Dependable scaling o f  an I/O subsystem to support petas­
cale is not as simple as adding more storage servers. In this paper, we present a stochastic activity network 
model that uses failure rates computed from real log data to predict the reliability and availability o f  the 
storage architecture o f  the ABE supercomputer cluster at the National Center fo r  Supercomputing Applica­
tions (NCSA). We then use the model developed to evaluate the challenges encountered as one scales the 
number o f  storage servers to support petascale computing. The results present new insights regarding the 
dependability challenges that will be encountered when building next-generation petascale supercomputers.
Keywords: Simulation, data analysis, modeling techniques, reliability and availability, storage systems.
Contact author: Shravan Gaonkar
1. Introduction
Historically, scientific computing has driven large-scale computing resources to their limits. Towards the 
end of the current decade we are likely to achieve petascale computing, a development that would bene-
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fit many applications, such as climate and environmental modeling, 3D protein molecule reconstruction, 
aerospace engineering, and nanotechnology. While supercomputer performance has improved by over two 
orders of magnitude every decade, the performance gap between the individual nodes and the overall pro­
cessing ability of an entire system has widened drastically [14]. This has led to a shift in the paradigm of 
supercomputer design, from a centralized approach to a distributed one that supports heterogeneity. While 
most high-performance computing environments require parallel file systems, there have been several file 
systems, such as GPFS [11], PVFS2 [17], and Lustre [3], that have been specifically proposed to support 
very large-scale scientific computing environments.
As the number of individual computing resources and components becomes very large, the frequency 
of failure of components within these clusters and the propagation of these failures to other resources are 
important concerns to high-performance computing applications. Failures can be caused by many factors: 
(a) transient hardware faults due to increased chip density, (b) software error propagation due to a large 
buggy legacy code base, or (c) manufacturing defects and environmental factors such as temperature or 
humidity.
Recent literature on failure analysis of BlueGene/L discusses various causes of increased downtime of 
supercomputers [7]. It has been well-established that elimination of failures is impossible; it is only feasible 
to circumvent failures and to mitigate their effects on a system’s performance. The standard approach to the 
mitigation of a failure is to checkpoint the application at regular intervals. Long et al., however, showed that 
checkpointing has a large impact on the performance of very large high-performance computers with large 
numbers of nodes [16]. In particular, they were able to estimate that more than half the computation time 
would be spent checkpointing the application state due to the time spent in transferring the application state 
to the persistent storage.
Increasing the number of compute servers in a cluster almost always increases the size of the desired 
storage subsystem. Depending on the type of parallel file system, that means an increase in the number 
of file servers that could accept requests from the compute servers to keep up with I/O requests. Compute 
servers and file servers have very different characteristics. First, a failure in a file server needs more attention 
than a failure in a compute node. A compute server might just be marked as unavailable until it is repaired, 
but a failed file server might have to be reconstructed, or its state might need to be transferred to another 
file server depending on the replication strategy. Second, file servers are inherently slower due to their I/O 
characteristics. This generally makes file servers the bottleneck for the reliability and performance of a
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cluster. Unfortunately, there has been a trend towards increasing failure rates for I/O subsystems that is 
similar to that for overall petascale clusters. This increase in failures can be attributed to the usual increase 
in the number o f individual components that are needed to make the whole I/O subsystem work. Recent 
studies have shown that workload intensity is highly correlated to the failure rates [12, 15]. That emphasizes 
the need for thorough analysis to understand the impact of the I/O subsystems and their failures on petascale 
computers, as the I/O subsystem is one o f the primary bottlenecks in high-performance computing.
To address the research challenge of providing realistic prediction o f petascale file system availability, 
we take a two-pronged approach. First, we have obtained the failure event log of the ABE cluster from 
the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The log contains the failures of individual 
nodes, file server nodes, and the storage area network (SAN). We preprocessed the event logs to determine 
various reward measures of interest corresponding to the file system, such as the availability of the file 
system over the lifetime of the log and the failure rate of jobs due to I/O failures and other transient failures. 
Then, we built and refined stochastic models of the file system used by these clusters that abstracts much 
of the operations, while generating reward measures that are comparable to the real log events. We then 
scaled the models to reflect the scale and magnitude of a future petascale computer and estimated the impact 
o f current I/O and file system designs on a petascale computer. Furthermore, we evaluated strategies that 
could be used to mitigate the bottlenecks due to scaling of I/O file system and cluster designs from current 
supercomputers to petascale computers. Our analysis will give storage architects support to make informed 
design choices as they build larger cluster file systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the cluster file 
system (CFS). Section 3 discusses the file system architecture of the ABE cluster at NCSA with the analysis 
of collected failure log files. Section 4 presents the conceptual stochastic activity network model of the 
ABE cluster. Section 5 covers results and analysis. Section 6 outlines related work. Section 7 offers our 
conclusions and plans for future work.
2. Cluster File System (CFS) Architecture
Typical storage architecture for a cluster file system consists of a metadata server, multiple file servers, 
and clients [3]. The metadata server maintains the file system’s metadata, which includes the access control 
information, mapping of files and directory names to their locations, and mapping of allocated and free 
space. The metadata server serves the metadata to the clients. The file servers maintain the actual data 
and information about the file blocks stored on the connected I/O disks and serve these file blocks to the
3
clients. For reliability/ performance, the file blocks can be replicated/striped over multiple disks. The client 
communicates first with the metadata server and then with the appropriate file server to perform the read 
and write operation.
2.1. Metadata Server
The metadata server maintains the state of the entire file system. The organizational structure of a single 
central server could be the main bottleneck for the failure of the file system. However, the bottleneck can be 
mitigated by internal replication of the node, maintenance o f an operation log to reconstruct upon failure, 
or other strategies. In the case of IBM’s GPFS, the metadata can be distributed and handled by a pool of 
file servers [11]. The metadata server node receives client requests for the location of the file blocks. The 
metadata server replies with the corresponding location of the file blocks on the file servers.
2.2. File Server
The file  servers or the object storage servers (OSS) are dynamic resources. New file servers can be 
added. Failed servers are purged automatically. Each file server can be as simple as a Linux file server 
running on commercial off-the-shelf systems or a dedicated enterprise-class storage server. The file server 
nodes can further augment reliability mechanisms, using techniques such as RAID, to protect the content on 
the individual servers. The throughput o f a file server depends on the network backbone connecting to the 
compute node clients and the internal I/O capacity of the server.
2.3. Client
The client nodes (compute nodes) proxy the requests on behalf of the user or applications. Modem cluster 
file systems cache the requested files on the client side and only transmit or propagate write requests.
3 ABE Cluster: System Configuration and Log File Analysis
The ABE cluster architecture is the current state-of-the-art. ABE consists of 1200 blade compute nodes, 
i.e., 9600 core CPU Intel 64 (2.33 GHz dual-socket quad-core) processors, 8/16 GBytes shared RAM per 
node, and an InfiniBand (IB) interface. The cluster runs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 (Linux 2.6.9) as its 
operating system. The cluster can provide a peak compute performance of 89.47 PFLOPS. The Lustre file 
system supports a 100TB parallel cluster file system for the ABE cluster’s compute nodes[2].
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Lustre-FS outage time
Cause of Failure Start time End time Hours
I/O hardware 07/21/07 23:03 07/22/07 12:00 12.95
I/O hardware 07/31/07 01:49 07/31/07 20:01 18.18
I/O hardware 08/22/07 18:08 08/23/07 02:15 08.12
I/O hardware 08/28/07 16:20 08/29/07 18:01 01.67
I/O hardware 09/25/07 18:00 09/26/07 09:30 15.50
I/O hardware 10/04/07 09:30 10/04/07 21:55 12.42
Batch system 10/16/07 17:56 10/16/07 21:24 03.47
Network 10/29/07 11:53 10/29/07 15:15 03.36
File system 11/16/07 09:30 11/16/07 10:00 00.40
File system 11/19/07 09:04 11/19/07 11:00 01.93
Table 1. User notification of outage of the Lustre-FS
3.1. ABE CFS Server Hardware
The ABE Lustre-FS is currently supported by 24 Dell dual Xeon servers that provide 12 fail-over pairs1. 
One OSS serve the metadata of the Lustre-FS, 8 OSSes serve the /cfs/scratch OSS, and the remaining 6 
servers handle the remaining partitions of the shared file systems (home, local, usr, etc.) o f the cluster. Each 
server self-monitors its file system’s health. The 2 metadata OSSes are connected to the storage I/O through 
a dual 2Gb fiber channel (FC).
3.2. ABE CFS Storage Hardware
Scratch partition: 2 S2A9550 storage units, from DataDirect Networks Systems, provides the storage 
hardware for the CFS’s scratch partition. Each S2A9550 supports 8 4Gb FC ports. Each port connects to 3 
tiers of SATA disks. Each tier has (8+2) disks in RAID6 configuration. Therefore, there are 480 disks, each 
with a 250GB capacity, that form the scratch partition providing 96TB of usable space.
Metadata: DDN EF2800 provides the I/O hardware to support the metadata of the Lustre-FS. It is con­
nected to the 2 metadata OSSes through a dual 2Gb fiber channel. The EF2800 has one tier of 10 disks in 
RAID 10 configuration.
Other partitions: 10 IBM DS4500s server an approximate total o f 40T of usable space over a SAN via 
2Gb FC.
Lustre settings: Lustre version 1.4.10.X runs on all of the OSS’s hardware. Most of the reliability is 
provided by the SAN hardware; therefore, the Lustre reliability features are switched off.
1 We refer to a fail-over pair as an OSS in the reminder of the paper.
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Date 2 Date 4 Date 6
07/03/07 102 07/19/07 258 08/16/07 375
08/20/07 591 09/05/07 005 09/17/07 002
09/18/07 004 09/19/07 003 09/28/07 463
09/29/07 477 10/01/07 051 10/02/07 035
Table 2. Lustre mount failure notification by compute nodes from 07/01/07 to 10/02/07. Column 2, 4, and 6 are the number of 
compute nodes that experienced mount failure
Total jobs submitted between 05/13/07 to 10/02/07 44085
Total failures due to transient network errors 1234
Total failures due to other/file system errors 0184
Table 3. Job execution statistics for the ABE cluster
3.3. ABE Log Failure Analysis
All NCSA clusters have elaborate logging and monitoring services built into them. The log data set used in 
this study was collected from 05/03/2007 to 10/02/2007 for compute nodes (compute-logs) and 09/05/2007 
to 11/30/2007 for the SAN (SAN-logs). The compute-logs and SAN-logs are monitored precisely, and 
the logs provide details about the events taking place in the cluster. Events are reported with the node IP 
addresses and the event time appended to the log information. To extract accurate failure event information, 
we filter failure logs based on temporal and causal relationships between events.
Table 1 provides the availability of the ABE cluster based on the notifications provided by the SAN 
administrators to the users [1]. The availability of ABE’s SAN can be estimated to be between 0.97 and 
0.98 depending on the dates one chooses as the start and end times for the measure computation. Table 2 
shows Lustre-FS mount failures experienced by individual compute nodes aggregated on a per-day basis. 
Lustre-FS mount failures does not always imply the failure o f the CFS as these errors could be caused due 
intermittent network unavailability. Nevertheless, those errors are perceived as failures from the cluster’s 
perspective.
Table 3 presents the job failure/completion statistics obtained by analyzing the compute-log. The analysis 
shows that the transient errors causing network unavailability (between the compute nodes and the CFS or 
between the compute nodes and the login nodes) are 5 times more likely to cause job failures that other 
errors are (such as software errors, or CFS failures). Earlier clusters had dedicated backplanes connected to 
compute nodes to provide communication. Current communication in ABE is through COTS network ports 
and switches. The change in the design choice is mostly intended to lower costs and increase flexibility in 
maintaining the system.
Table 4 provides the disk failure and replacement log from 09/05/2007 to 11/28/2007 for disks that support
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Dates in September 2007 05 06 09 13 23
Number of failed disks 2 1 1 1 1
Dates in October 2007 08 17 24
Number of failed disks 2 1 1
Dates in November 2007 08 17
Number of failed disks 1 1
Survival analysis of the disk failures (n = 480) using Weibull 
regression (in log relative-hazard form) gives the shape parameter as 
0.6963571 with standard deviation of 0.1923109 (95% confidence interval) [5]
Table 4. Disk failure log from 09/05/2007 to 11/28/2007 for disks supporting the ABE’s scratch partition
the scratch partition of the ABE’s cluster. The authors of [13] estimated the disks’ hazard rate function to 
be statistically equivalent to a Weibull distribution. We performed similar survival analysis on the disk 
failure data and found that Weibull with /3 =  0.7 was a good fit for ABE’s disk drive failure logs. The key 
insights we gained from analyzing failure data and from discussions with cluster system administrators are 
as follows:
•  The disk replication redundancy and replacement have been so well-streamlined that they almost never 
cause catastrophic failure of the CES. On average, 0-2 disks are replaced on the ABE cluster per week.
•  The ABE cluster’s S2A9550 RAID6 (8+2) technology combines the virtues of RAID3, RAID5, and 
RAID0 to provide both reliability and performance [8]. RAID6 prevents a second drive failure from 
occurring during disk re-mirroring. The Blue Waters petascale computer, which will be built at the 
University of Illinois, will likely have an (8+3) RAID configuration. That would make the failure of 
the file system due to multiple individual disk failures highly unlikely.
•  Most file system failures are due to software errors, configuration errors, and other transient errors. 
The software errors take, on average, 2-4 hours to resolve. Most often, the fix is to bring the disks to 
a consistent state using a file system check (fsck). A hardware failure due to a network components 
or due to a RAID controller might take up to 24 hours to resolve, as these components need to be 
procured from a vendor.
4. Stochastic Activity Network Model: Cluster File System
The failure data analysis and the insights provide the details necessary to build a stochastic model of the 
ABE’s cluster file system. Here, we describe the details of the stochastic activity network models using 
Mobius [4].
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CLIENT
RAID6TIERS
Figure 1. Compositional model of the Cluster File System.
4.1. Overall Model
Figure 1 shows the composed model o f the ABE cluster using replicate/join composition in Mobius. 
The leaf nodes in the replicate/join tree are stochastic activity network models which implement the func­
tionalities. Space limitations does not permit detailed descriptions of these submodels. The CLUSTER 
model has two main submodels connected using a join where the models share states on error propaga­
tion from CLIENT to the CFS. The CLIENT represents the behavior and interaction of the compute nodes 
and the communication network between the compute nodes and the CFS. The CFSJJNIT emulates the 
ABE’s cluster file system. It is composed of the OSS, OSS_SAN_NW, SAN, and the DDNJJNITS. The 
OSS implements the availability and operational model of the metadata server and the file server. The 
OSS_SAN_NW implements the failure model of the network ports and switches that connect OSS to the 
DDNJJNITS. The SAN emulates the operations provided by the network to communicate between OSS 
and the DDNJJNITS. The OSS, OSS_SAN_NW, SAN and the DDNJJNITS communicate by sharing 
information about their current state o f operation and availability. The DDNJJNITS composes multiple 
RAID6 JJNITS with RAID_CONTROLLER. The failure of disks in RAID6 JJNITS is assumed to follow a 
Weibull distribution. RAIDXONTROLLER emulates the failure and operation of a typical RAID6 archi­
tecture. The DDNJJNITS is replicated to emulate multiple S2A9550 units.
Since the goal is to investigate the impact of availability of file systems to petascale computers, the 
stochastic activity network models do not consider hardware failure in compute nodes. Our model incorpo­
rates only the behavior of the scratch partition and the metadata servers of the CFS, because a clusters utility 
depends mainly on its scratch partition’s availability. Finally, hardware and software misconfiguration er­
rors occur in the early deployment phase of the system; therefore, we exclude them from the models. In the
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Model parameter Values (range)
Disk MTBF 2 100000-3000000
Annualized Failure Rate (AFR) 0.40%-8.6%
Weibull distribution’s shape parameter 1 0.6-1.0
Number of DDN 1 2-20
Number of compute nodes 1 1200-32000
Average time to replace disks 3 1-12 hours
Average time to replace hardware 3 12-36 hours
Average time to fix software 3 2-6 hours
Job request per hour 1 12-15 per hour
Hardware failure rate 1 1-2 per 720 hours
Software failure rate 1-2 per 720 hours
Annual growth rate of disk capacity 2 33%
DDN JJnits 1 2-20
OSS Units 1 8-80
Parameter values obtained from: log file analysis 1, data 
specification from literature and hardware white papers 2, 
discussions with NCSA cluster administrators3
Table 5. ABE cluster’s simulation model parameters
following subsections, we describe the reward measures and the failure model used to represent the ABE’s 
CFS.
4.2. Reward Measures
The availability of the cluster file system is defined as the ability of the CFS to serve the client nodes. 
More precisely, it is defined as the fraction of time when all the file server nodes (OSSes), the DDN, and the 
network interconnect between the OSSes and the DDN are in the working state.
The disk replacement rate is defined as the number of disks that need to be replaced per unit o f time to 
sustain the maximum availability of the CFS.
The cluster utility, CU, is an availability metric from the cluster’s perspective. Precisely, it is defined as 
C U = ( l -  n^ieeg" .^ CU is a metric different from availability metric 
of the CFS1. The cluster users and a SAN administrators tend to notice different levels of availability. This 
reason is failures in network communication between the compute nodes and the CFS as well as failures due 
to intermittent transient errors make CFS appear unavailable even though it has not failed.
4.3. Failure model for ABE’s CFS
The ABE’s cluster suffers from failures mainly because of 3 types of errors: hardware errors, software 
errors, and transient errors. Each kind of error affects all the CFS’s components.
The hardware errors in the metadata/file servers (OSSes) occur in the hardware components that are 
'CU does not distinguish between compute cycles used to perform checkpointing and those used for actual computation.
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built to operate the system. These errors include processor, memory, and network errors. Hardware errors 
are assumed to be less frequent than disk failures, occurring at the rate of 1-2 per month. The RAID 
controllers in the DDN or network ports/switches that connect DDN to OSS show similar failure rates. The 
repairs of these components takes 12-36 hours depending upon the severity of the failure (as reported by 
SAN administrators), as the needed replacement parts have to be shipped from the vendors. Most of the 
hardware is replicated with fail-over mechanisms. Failure of both members of the fail-over pair causes the 
unavailability of the CFS system. The replacement of failed disks is modeled as a deterministic event. The 
repair time is varied between 1 to 12 hours across simulation experiments.
The software errors that cause failure of the cluster file systems are mainly due to the corrupted su­
percomputing applications running on the compute nodes (implemented in the CLIENT submodel) or the 
Lustre-FS (implemented in the OSS submodel). Since we do not have accurate estimates on software cor­
ruption errors, we assume that the rates are similar in the orders of magnitude to hardware error rates. The 
repair times for software errors modeled as deterministic events. The repair time is varied between 2 to 6 
hours across simulation experiments.
Transient errors occur in most components of the cluster model, but mainly in the network components. 
The error rates are obtained from the failure-log analysis as shown in Table 3. Transient errors are temporary, 
but hard to diagnose. Our model assume that one of these errors causes a few minutes of unavailability of 
components under transient failure. The jobs depending on those components fail due to the temporary 
unavailability.
Past literature has emphasized the importance of modeling correlated failures [15]. Most correlated 
errors occur because o f shared resources. Correlated errors propagate to components that have causal or 
spatial proximity. In the CFS model, hardware errors propagate because other hardware components are 
connected to each other. Software errors propagate from compute nodes to OSS or from OSS to disk, leading 
to data corruption. Transient errors propagate errors into software. All failures except disk failures are 
modeled as exponential distributions. To model correlated failures, we assume that there is small probability, 
p, that errors can propagate to other connected components.
5. Experimental Results and Analysis
We evaluate the design of the ABE cluster’s availability using simulation in the Mobius tool. Table 5 
consolidates the parameters collected through failure log analysis, hardware reliability specifications, and 
discussions with cluster administrators. We scale the parameters values to reflect the size and scale of a
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0.6,8.76,8+2,4 ••*••0.6,4.38,8+2,4 -*+-0.7,2.92,8+2,4
(ABE)
ABE cluster scaled by storage size in Terabytes
Figure 2. Availability of storage with respect to disk failures. Label with values (0.7,2.92,8+2,4) represents a tuple =(Weibull shape
parameter ¡3, AFR in %, RAID configuration, average disk replacement time in hours)
petascale computer, and determine the factors that impede the high availability of the CFS. All the simulation 
results are reported at 95% confidence level, with intervals.
5.1. Impact of disk failures on CFS
To evaluate the baseline effect of failures of disks on availability of the CFS, we evaluate the DDN .UNITS 
models associated with the RAID6 tiers and the RAID controllers in isolation from failures of other compo­
nents of the SAN. Figure 2 shows the availability of the storage hardware as one scales the file system from 
the current 96TB (supporting the ABE’s scratch partition) to 12PB (supporting the petascale Blue Waters 
computers). The key observation is that the RAID6 architecture provides sufficient redundancy and recovery 
mechanisms such that the impact of high disk failure rates is mitigated to a very large extent. First, note 
that all configurations o f failure and recovery rates for an ABE sized cluster file system have nearly 100% 
availability (refer to first data point in Figure 2). However, as the experiments are scaled from the ABE’s 
system to a petascale system, our simulation results show that the RAID6 architecture cannot provide the 
same level of storage-availability for some of the failure model configurations. The SAN architect’s future 
vision to use (8+3) RAID in Blue Waters is important; it provides better reliability than the (8+2) RAID 
on petascale systems. While RAID6 provides a larger margin for disk failure rates, i.e., up to 8.6% AFR, 
it is very important that these rates be contained to lower thresholds by disk manufacturers and vendors to 
provide the adequate level of availability. If one makes a pessimistic assumption of a higher infant mortality 
rate in disks (Weibull shape parameter = 0.6), the availability falls below 99.9% for petascale storage.
To better understand the cost of disk replacement, we compute the expected number o f disks that need 
to be replaced per week for the RAID6 tiers. Figure 3 depicts the average number of disks that needs to be
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-*-0.7,8.76,8+2,4 - s - 0.7,2.92,8+2,4 -*-0.7,4.38,8+2,4 0.7,0.88.8+2,4
480(ABE) 960 1440 1920 2400 2880 3360 3840 4320 4800
ABE computer scaled by number of disks
Figure 3. Average number of disks that need to be replaced per week to sustain availability
replaced per week to sustain the availability so that the CFS does not suffer failure due to RAID6 failure. The 
configuration (0.7,2.92,8+2,4) corresponds to the ABE cluster with 0 to 2 disk replacements per week. Each 
time a disk fails, there is an operational cost (in dollars) that is borne by the SAN vendors as they provide 
extended support to their SANs. As the CFS system is scaled to support petascale computers, the number of 
disks that need to be replaced increases, increasing the labor cost and the replacement cost. Therefore, the 
SAN vendors have an incentive to increase the disk MTBF to reduce their overall support cost.
Survival analysis of the disk failures data provided a good estimate of the Weibull distributions’s shape 
parameter /3, but the estimate for the scale parameter (MTBF) was insignificant [5]. Using simulations, we 
estimated MTBF that matched the average disk failures per week for the scratch partition and determined 
MTFF=300,000 hours or annualized failure rate (AFR)=2.92% to be a good fit. These parameter values 
were used to evaluate petascale system’s reward measures.
5.2. CFS availability and CU
To analyze the impact of all components that determine the availability o f the CFS, we evaluate the 
availability and CU of the ABE system (refer to Section 4.2 for the definition of the reward measures). The 
experiments are scaled to the size of a petascale computer to allow understanding of the impact of failures 
on those measures. Figure 4 shows that the CFS-availability decreases as one scales the system to support 
a petascale computer. Since most of the parameter values were obtained through the log data analysis, and 
times reported by SAN administrators, our measures for CFS-availability matched with ABE’s availability 
as shown in Table 1. Therefore, we have higher confidence of the measures of availability and CU as we 
scaled the models to represent a petascale computer with a petabyte storage system. The storage-availability 
in Figure 4 refers to configuration (0.7,2.92,8+2,4), which models the ABE cluster’s current environment. 
We find that the RAID6 subsystem in this configuration continues to provide an availability of 1, but the
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Figure 4. Availability and utility of the ABE cluster when scaled to petaflop-petabyte system
CFS-availability is reduced from 0.972 to 0.909 as one scales the design to support the petascale system. 
The reduction is mainly due to correlated failures in OSS and hardware. Improving upon ABE’s design, 
the architect could provide an additional standby-spare OSS that can replace the failed OSS. Our evaluation 
shows that this approach can improve the availability by 3%. Unlike the RAID6 redundancy architecture for 
reliability, designing fault-tolerant OSS is both technically challenging and expensive due to the complexity 
of the OSS system. To improve the availability further, the architects have to develop solutions to mitigate 
correlated errors. For example, improving the robustness of the Lustre-FS can reduce the software-correlated 
errors. The CU in Figure 4 shows that the clusters network architecture between compute nodes and the CFS 
has a profound impact on the cluster utility available to the users. The trend to move away from customized 
backplanes to COTS network hardware (with its complicated software stack) has decreased the CU. The 
transient errors seen in the network can be mitigated by providing multiple network paths between the 
compute nodes and CFS.
6. Related work
Cluster model analysis: Past literature describes several attempts to model and analyze different aspects 
of large-scale supercomputing systems. Wang et al. looked at the impact on the system performance in 
the presence of correlated failures as the systems are scaled to several hundred thousand processors [16]. 
Rosti et al. presented a formal model to capture CPU and I/O interactions in scientific applications, to 
characterize system performance [10]. Oliner et al. investigated the impact of checkpointing overhead using 
a distribution obtained from a real BlueGene/L log [9]. Some literature has discussed the importance of 
distributing data across multiple disks to improve performance and reliability of a file system [6]. While 
[6,9, 16] have evaluated the cluster from a performance viewpoint (mostly focused on checkpointing and its 
overhead), our analysis, backed with real cluster failure data, isolates the file system and models its impact
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on designs of larger cluster file systems to support petascale computers.
Failure model analysis: The estimation and prediction of failure of file systems are crucial to understand­
ing the overall performance of petascale computers. Recent literature has shown that storage subsystems are 
prone to higher failure rates than their makers estimate because of underrepresented disk infant mortality 
rates [13]. Schroeder and Gibson studied the failure characteristics of large computing systems to find that 
failure rates are proportional to the size of the system and are highly correlated with the type and intensity of 
the workload running on it [12]. While Liang et al. investigated the failure events from the event logs from 
BlueGene/L to develop failure prediction models to anticipate future fatal failures [7], our approach builds 
accurate structural and operational models using the failure data from the logs of the cluster and discussions 
with the SAN architects to provide finer details about current systems with insights into future cluster file 
system design.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Many researchers have focused on developing and understanding reliability of clusters for supercomput­
ing applications. In our paper, we have taken steps to understand the reliability and availability of the ABE 
cluster through failure data analysis and discussions with administrators at multiple levels of the cluster op­
eration, starting from the lowest level of the SAN’s availability, to cluster’s availability, and then to user/job 
perception of cluster utility. Our key findings through analysis and simulation showed that the RAID6 de­
sign for a disk’s reliability has limited the impact of disk failures on the CFS, even when the model is scaled 
to evaluate the support for petascale system. On the other hand, transient errors, hardware errors, and soft­
ware errors contribute significantly to failures, and these components are the limiting factors for the high 
availability of the CFS. We believe that petascale architects will have to focus on these issues to develop 
solutions to improve the overall availability of the CFS.
Future work: Our work has mainly focused on evaluating the availability of the ABE’s CFS through 
data collection, analysis, and system modeling. We showed that system modeling combined with data anal­
ysis from real systems provides better intuition for designing future systems. NCSA has other operational 
clusters such as Mercury and Tungsten, with different architectures. There is an opportunity to evaluate and 
analyze these systems to determine how the ABE architecture was designed based on the lessons learned 
from the older clusters. That analysis could provide insight into future CFS architectures on petascale sys­
tems. The models and data analysis (on larger failure data sets) can be extended to evaluate performance 
metrics that would complement the reliability measures conducted in this research.
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